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The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales
Tracey L. Mearest
and Dan M. Kahantt
The street corner at 79th and Essex does not make any
sense .... When I leave work these same guys are out
there every evening. When you walk down the street, the
first thing they do is run up to you....
They watch you. They know where you live. They know
what time you leave, what time you come home. I am
afraid of them....
I don't want to hurt anyone, and I don't want to be hurt.
We need to clean these corners up. Clean these communi-
ties up and take it back from them.
Ms. D'Ivory Gordon
Resident of Chicago's
7th Ward1
Ms. D'Ivory Gordon, like many of her neighbors, was con-
cerned enough about gang violence in her community to make a
public statement about it. She testified in support of a new ordi-
nance designed to help alleviate gang violence in Chicago. The
Chicago City Council ultimately adopted the Gang Congregation
Ordinance, or as it is more commonly known, "the gang loitering
ordinance," in the summer of 1992.2 The Chicago Police Depart-
ment specified additional enforcement provisions,3 and began en-
forcing the ordinance that same summer.4 Then, in Chicago v
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
tt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
, Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, 1 Transcript of Proceedings
66-67 (May 11, 1992).
2 Chicago Municipal Code § 84-015 (1992).
Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 (1992) (specifying guidelines
for enforcement of Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance).
' Robert Davis, Special units to police loiterers: city wants to make new gang law hold
up in court, Chi Trib 3 (June 19, 1992) (discussing the enforcement provisions).
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Youkhana,5 the Illinois Appellate Court struck the gang loitering
ordinance as facially unconstitutional.' The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed this judgment in October of 1997 in Chicago v
Morales.7
This article argues that the Youkhana and Morales decisions
are wrong. These decisions, we argue, demonstrate a commit-
ment to an anachronistic and unduly abstract understanding of
individual rights - one fashioned to address political conditions
that, by and large, no longer characterize American society.
Though the residents of inner city communities increasingly de-
mand law enforcement measures in response to the crime prob-
lems they face, the understanding of constitutional criminal pro-
cedural rights promoted by Youkhana and Morales threatens to
hamper and retard the development of innovative community
policing measures these citizens desire. This result not only de-
nies communities a useful tool to combat violent crime; it also
may harm criminal defendants. Because these judicial attempts
to control police discretion will fail in predictable ways, it is likely
to remit communities to law enforcement strategies that make
offenders worse off than if the courts had upheld Chicago's gang
loitering ordinance.
This article has four parts. Part I provides more detail about
Chicago's gang loitering ordinance - its enactment, enforcement,
and purported effects. Part II outlines the Youkhana and Mora-
les decisions and argues that the reasoning of these two opinions
is incorrect. This part shows that the courts relied primarily on
an outdated interpretation of Papachristou v Jacksonville8 in or-
der to find that the gang loitering ordinance failed a facial chal-
lenge. Part III outlines an alternative way of thinking about pro-
tecting rights - an approach that takes into account contempo-
rary social and political circumstances. Finally, Part IV shows
how high the stakes are in this debate. Chicago's loitering ordi-
nance is not an isolated example of proactive policing. In fact,
many urban areas are involved in sustained projects of law en-
forcement innovation.9 While the techniques vary (curfews, loi-
660 NE2d 34 (111 App 1995).
Id at 36.
687 NE2d 53, 59 (Ill 1997). While this article was in press, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Morales. 118 S Ct 1510 (1998).
8 405 US 156 (1972).
' See Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 Georgetown L J 1153 (1998) (noting numerous examples of the "new community
policing"); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum L Rev 551 (1997).
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tering laws, loitering with intent, order maintenance policing),
each enjoys high levels of support among members of minority
communities. Those who challenge these laws typically assume
erroneously that such communities are opposed to higher levels of
policing. Ignoring the reality of this support harms all residents
of affected inner city neighborhoods, whether these residents are
considered "law breaking" or "law abiding."
I. THE GANG-LOITERING LAW: POLITICALLY DISCIPLINED
DISCRETION
In response to voluminous citizen complaints about drive-by
shootings, fighting, and open-air drug dealing, Alderman William
Beavers, the representative of a predominantly black ward and
chair of the Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire,
sought to introduce an ordinance to restrict gang-related congre-
gations in public ways in 1992. Residents of several of Chicago's
high-crime neighborhoods, including D'Ivory Gordon, claimed
during Police and Fire Committee hearings that collections of
loitering gang members and their hangers-on were frightening
and intimidating.'0 Aldermanic committee members testified
that their constituents' concerns echoed these claims."
Proponents of the gang loitering ordinance believed that its
enforcement could address the problems. Testimony centered on
prevention. 2 The council noted that street gangs often exert con-
trol over physical space by loitering: they intimidate members of
other gangs and non-gang-involved neighborhood residents, pre-
venting entrance into controlled areas.3  Thus, an obvious solu-
tion was a policy that allowed police to break a gang's grip on cer-
tain public spaces.
The gang loitering ordinance was passed in the summer of
1992, with the critical support of the leaders of the highest crime
(and mostly minority) wards. 4 Specifically, the ordinance em-
powered police officers who observed a person that officer rea-
sonably believed to be a criminal street gang member loitering in
" Chicago City Council Committee on Police and Fire, 1 Transcript Proceedings 56,
61, 66, 69, 75, 93, 104, 125 (May 11, 1992) (examples of testimony from Chicago residents
given in support of the ordinance).
See generally, id.
12 The comments of former Cook County State's Attorney, Jack O'Malley, are indica-
tive, "I am convinced it's an ordinance along these lines that would really prevent the kind
of activity that leads to more violent and serious crime... " Id at 6.
See, for example, comments of Alderman Wojeik, id at 62.
" See Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, When Rights Are Wrong, (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors).
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a public place with one or more people, to order the group to dis-
perse. 5 If the group refused to disperse, the police officer could
arrest those who refused to move on.
The Chicago Police Department did not enforce the law until
Police Superintendent Matt Rodriguez signed a general order
specifying additional constraints. 6 General Order 92-4, author-
ized only gang tactical unit officers and other youth officers -
those assumed to have the greatest knowledge of Chicago's
criminal street gangs - to enforce the new ordinance. The order
also required these units to collect detailed information on gangs
in the areas where the ordinance was enforced, in order to insure
that enforcing officers could work from particular facts rather
than from hunches in identifying loitering gang members. Gen-
eral Order 92-4 specified that this information was to be main-
tained and updated to insure that it included only the names of
individuals the Chicago Police Department had probable cause to
believe were members of criminal street gangs operating in the
relevant district.
In addition, the order specified that the ordinance could be
enforced only in certain areas of police districts with demon-
strated gang problems. To designate these areas several sources
of information were to be used: crime pattern information from
the department ICAM program, 7 citizen complaints, and police
observations. The knowledge of community residents was per-
haps the most important piece of information for designating en-
forcement areas. District commanders were instructed to consult
community residents before designating gang "hot spots." 8 In
other words, the enforcement order specifically envisioned a
grounded model of policing whereby community residents were
partnered with the police to help prevent crime.
Finally, no Chicago Police officer was allowed to enforce the
gang loitering ordinance without undergoing special training.
Superintendent Rodriguez imposed the training to guard against
sweeps of innocent youths and to underscore his mandate that
the law be enforced very carefully.9
" Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992). The ordinance additionally described in
detail the meaning of "loiter," "criminal street gang," and "public place." Finally, the ordi-
nance prescribed punishment for violations.
IS Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 (1992).
Information Collection of Automated Mapping ("ICAM") is an innovative, geo-
graphically based computer system that helps police departments identify crime hotspots.
Mapping Crime, Chi Sun-Times 3 (Nov 30, 1994).
j8 Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 (1992).
Davis, Special units to police loiterers, Chi Trib 3 (cited in note 4).
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II. THE GANG-LOITERING DECISIONS: MISPERCEIVING CONTEXT
The Youkhana and Morales courts ignored these important
limits on police discretion. The Illinois appellate court in
Youkhana claimed that the ordinance was "beyond saving by ju-
dicial construction,"20 and that it "smack[ed] of a police-state tac-
tic."2' The Morales Court was also dismissive of the Chicago Po-
lice Department's efforts to guide the discretion of enforcing offi-
cers," ignoring the promulgated regulations completely in the
analysis of the ordinance's constitutionality. The Morales Court
concluded that Chicago's ordinance was an arbitrary exercise of
the City's police power that violated the federal constitution's
guarantee of substantive due process to individuals.'
Though the lower court and the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted different analyses of the ordinance, the thrust of their
opinions is similar. Each court determined that Chicago's gang
loitering law was impermissibly vague, thereby failing the consti-
tutional requirement to provide individuals notice of proscribed
conduct, and failing to adequately limit arbitrary and discrimina-
tory police enforcement. Because of these concerns, each court
drew predictable parallels between Chicago's gang loitering ordi-
nance, and the vagrancy law struck down by the United States
Supreme Court in Papachristou v Jacksonville.'
Papachristou is, of course, well-known. It is commonly re-
ferred to in debates about the constitutionality of loitering ordi-
nances.' Still, it is worth taking a closer look at the statute
struck down in the case and situating the enforcement of the law
against the relevant political and social context. The law at issue
in Papachristou provided:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about
begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or
unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common
Chicago v Youkhana, 660 NE2d, 39 (Ill App 1995).
2, Id at 38.
Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53, 64 (Ill 1997).
Interestingly, the Morales Court concluded that because it determined that the
gang loitering ordinance violated substantive due process, there was no need for the court
to analyze whether the ordinance violated specific provisions of the Bill of Rights such as
the First, Fourth, or Eighth Amendments. Id at 59.
24 405 US 156 (1972).
See, for example, Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 551 (cited in note 9); Comment,
Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loiter-
ing Laws, 83 Calif L Rev 379 (1995); Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang
Loitering Laws, 69 Chi Kent L Rev 461 (1993).
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night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,
keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, dis-
orderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill
fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children
shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Mu-
nicipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D of-
fenses."
This particular ordinance was enforced against Papachris-
tou, who, along with her companions, another white woman and
two African American men, were charged with "prowling by
auto. 27 Jimmy Lee Smith, another defendant in the case, also
challenged the validity of the ordinance enforced against him.
Smith was arrested between 9 and 10 a.m. on a weekday in down-
town Jacksonville while waiting for a friend to bring a car Smith
wanted to borrow so that he could apply for a job at a produce
company. Smith, it turns out, worked part time for a black politi-
cal group.
Arrests like these undoubtedly motivated Justice Douglas to
write that Florida's ordinance furnished police with "a convenient
tool for 'harsh and discriminatory treatment... against particu-
lar groups deemed to merit their displeasure."'2 The groups
Douglas had in mind were the poor and unpopular. As Douglas
had explained in a famous Yale Law Journal article written in
1960, it was naive to defer to the community's approval of loiter-
ing and vagrancy laws because those arrested under them typi-
cally came "from minority groups" who lacked sufficient political
clout "to protect themselves, and who do not have the prestige to
prevent an easy laying-on of hands by the police."
Douglas's writings direct attention to the importance of an
assessment of the position occupied by the disfavored minorities
405 US at 156 n 1.
Id at 158.
Id at 170.
Id. See also William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L J 1
(1960).
Douglas, 70 Yale L J at 13.
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against whom Jacksonville's ordinance was enforced. In 1960,
when Douglas wrote in the Yale Law Journal, only 29.1 percent
of the South's adult blacks were registered to vote, in contrast to
61.1 percent of whites. 1 Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, and literacy
tests were important components of the South's regime of apart-
heid.32 So was violence.3 During the turbulent civil rights era
many blacks were beaten, firebombed, shot and even murdered
while the law enforcement agents who had sworn to protect them
participated in, tolerated or ignored this violent abuse. The hor-
rific television images of black people in Birmingham, including
small children, attacked by police dogs and police officers wield-
ing high pressure water hoses and clubs are indelible and poign-
ant reminders of the South's state-supported violent resistance to
civil rights progress. Things were not much better in the urban
North, where machine politics of the kind made famous by Rich-
ard Daley in Chicago effectively precluded legally-enfranchised
African Americans and other minorities from meaningfully influ-
encing the political process. Northern residents of overcrowded,
segregated ghettoes of central cities had limited access to essen-
tial public institutions, including critical law enforcement re-
sources.
Lack of access to law enforcement resources by minority resi-
dents of the South and North manifested in both the under-
enforcement and the over-enforcement of the criminal law in mi-
nority communities. In the decade prior to the Papachristou de-
cision crime had climbed to levels that were higher than at any
time since the thirties. Rates of both robbery and property
crimes exhibited the sharpest increases during this decade. Im-
portantly, crime was concentrated where poor people, usually
people of color, were concentrated - namely, large urban areas.
A few crime statistics make the point. In 1967 African Americans
comprised over half of the known homicide victims, 4 and an early
victimization survey conducted in the mid sixties reveals that
non-whites were victimized more often than whites by robbery,
3, Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980 116
(Praeger 1982). African American turnout was also disproportionately low, with a 44.9
percent disadvantage in the South and a 20.2 percent disadvantage in the non-South
during the same period. Id at 117; see also id generally (explaining dramatic increases in
registration and turnout by blacks between 1964 and 1980).
' See Steven F. Lawson, Running For Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in
America Since 1941 22-23 (McGraw-Hill, 1990).
See Kay Mills, This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fanny Lou Hamer (Dutton
1993).
' Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook 1995, Table 3.130 at 358 (GPO 1996).
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rape, aggravated assault, burglary, and auto theft. 5 Even after
controlling for socioeconomic status researchers still found that
blacks were almost twice as likely to be crime victims as whites
in the same low-income group." Surveys also revealed that -
like homicide - rape, aggravated assault, burglary, and auto
theft were predominantly intragroup offenses." Due to residen-
tial segregation, it is likely that minority victims often were vic-
timized by their neighbors.
As the Kerner Commission Report noted, police responded to
these problems by doing nothing." Police failure to promote ade-
quate protection and services in disadvantaged minority neigh-
borhoods was a common complaint before the Commission. Of
course, the arrest rates referred to above reflect only the serious
crimes tracked by the FBI Crime Reports. These reports obscure
the even greater number of commonly-occurring disorder of-
fenses. White police officers patrolling urban ghettoes, however,
often dismissed violations of sex, drinking and gambling laws
along with intraracial simple assaults as "typically Negro." 9
Just as underpolicing of crime and disorder in many segre-
gated, impoverished urban neighborhoods was a common prob-
lem, so was overpolicing in the form of harassment and brutality.
Chicago had a particularly noteworthy record of problematic po-
licing. For example, Chicago's civilian death rate at the hands of
law enforcement officers between 1968 and 1969 was significantly
higher than that of New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and De-
troit that year, and 75 percent of the civilians slain were black.0
The explanation? Many of the civilians killed were identified as
"fleeing felons."4' In other urban areas, minorities were subjected
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of a Crime Free Society 40 (GPO 1967).
Philip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a Na-
tional Survey 31, in The Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, 2 Field Surveys (GPO 1967).
President's Commission, The Challenge of a Crime Free Society at 40.
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Otto Kerner chairman, Report
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 10-11 (Bantam 1968).
Marvin E. Wolfgang, Crime and Race: Conception and Misconceptions 50 (Institute
of Human Relations 1964).
" Metcalfe Blue Ribbon Panel Report, The Misuse of Police Authority in Chicago 30
(1972) ("Metcalfe Report").
For an empirical study of police shootings involving black victims, see James J.
Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J Crim L & Criminol 707 (1982). See
also Kevin P. Jenkins, Police Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities: Ways to Stop the
Killing, 9 Harv Blackletter J 1 (1992); Tennessee v Garner, 471 US 1, 6 (1984) (holding
Tennessee statute allowing police to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon unconstitu-
tional for failure to meet Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards).
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to other types of official abuse by police. Sometimes police exer-
cised their authority to arrest under disorderly conduct, vagrancy
and loitering statutes to harass minority youths and adults.42
The last example should bring to mind the facts of Papachristou.
Indeed, Papachristou was only one of a series of landmark
criminal procedure decisions decided against the background of
institutionalized racism.4' The Court's jurisprudential innova-
tions were clearly geared to responding to this problem.44 The
conception of rights embodied in Papachristou and other cases of
this time emphasize two interdependent principles: community
distrust and discretion skepticism. Each of these principles in
the Court's jurisprudence was clearly aimed at counteracting the
distorting influence of institutionalized racism on America's
criminal justice system.
The 1960s conception of rights showed distrust for commum-
ties insofar as it licensed relentless judicial second-guessing of
democratic political institutions on the appropriate balance be-
tween order and liberty. In an important sense, all rights reflect
community distrust because they protect the interests of vulner-
able minorities from majority overreaching. What made the
1960s conception of rights uniquely distrustful was its extension
of searching judicial scrutiny to basic neighborhood policing tech-
niques that historically had been viewed as advancing the wel-
fare of the community at large.
Our brief review of the existence and effects of widespread
minority disenfranchisement in the sixties and prior demon-
strates that institutionalized racism fully justified the Court's
suspicion of democratic politics. Blacks in Jacksonville, Florida,
for example, may not have participated in the adoption by the
relevant municipal body of that statute. After its adoption, they
also may have been unable to hold the police officers who en-
forced the law against them accountable through the political
process. The same was true in other cities, North and South, in
42 For comments from Philadelphia inner city residents on police harassment tech-
niques, see Joseph D. Lohman and Gordon E. Misner, 2 The Police and the Community:
The Dynamics of Their Relationship in a Changing Society 121-27, in The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 4 Field Surveys (GPO
1967). See also Metcalfe Report, The Misuse of Police Authority in Chicago at 31 (cited in
note 40).
See generally Kahan and Meares, 86 Georgetown L J 1153 (cited in note 9).
See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 76-135 (Pantheon 1997); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 820, 839-40 (1994);
Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 596-600 (cited in note 9); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L J 1, 5, 50
(1997).
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which public order provisions were used to harrass minorities.
Discretion skepticism is the next important feature of Pa-
pachristou and cases like it. Papachristou represents decisions
that are anti-discretion insofar as they insist that the authority of
law enforcement officials to arrest and search must be defined
with exacting precision. Again, anxiety about institutionalized
racism motivates this jurisprudential innovation. While discre-
tion advances the public interest by giving law enforcers the
flexibility to respond to circumstances too numerous and diverse
to be addressed in detail by legislative rulemakers, discretion also
threatens the public good by giving law enforcers the latitude to
abuse their power for personal ends.
The primary check against such abuse is the accountability
of law enforcers to the community's political representatives. Be-
fore the civil rights movement, however, law enforcement officials
were accountable only to representatives of the white majority.
Indeed, for precisely this reason, there was every reason to be-
lieve that police would use discretion to harass and repress mi-
norities. The Court's requirement that legislatures constrain law
enforcement discretion through very clear and specific rules is an
anti-delegation doctrine - discretion skepticism prevents legisla-
tures from delegating to politically unaccountable law enforce-
ment agents unlimited authority to discriminate. Moreover,
these rules also made it much easier for courts to detect and
punish racially motivated abuses of authority.
Given the nature of the problems that then confronted Afri-
can Americans, and given the Courts own institutional capaci-
ties, the development of the conception of rights embodied in Pa-
pachristou deserves admiration. Nonetheless, it should be clear
that both the law at issue in that case, as well as the political and
social dynamics of the time, do not map well onto the contempo-
rary circumstances against which Morales and Youkhana were
decided.
To begin, consider the differences between the law at issue in
Papachristou and the Chicago gang-loitering ordinance. The
Jacksonville statue's open-ended language could easily be applied
to any person, in any situation, at-any time, by any police officer.
The language of the Chicago ordinance, in contrast, is designed to
cabin police discretion, not enlarge it. Additionally, police de-
partment regulations were adopted to further guide the discre-
tion of the small group of officers who were trained to enforce the
law.
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This comparison is not the only basis for analysis, however.
We must also consider political and social changes that have oc-
curred since Papachristou. In light of these changes, it should be
clear that Papachristou's conception of rights is wrong for the
nineties.
African Americans are no longer excluded from the nation's
democratic political life. Voter registration levels among African
Americans skyrocketed almost immediately after enactment of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A year after its passage an aver-
age of 46 percent of adult blacks in the five states of the Deep
South could vote - a 100 percent increase.45 In Mississippi, the
percentage skyrocketed from 7 percent to 67 percent in four
years.46 In all regions of the country African Americans have
translated voting power into political representation. Prior to
1973, black representation in the House of Rlpresentatives was
never higher than 3 percent. In 1991, twenty-four African
Americans served in Congress, and four years later that number
increased to thirty-nine - 9 percent of all members of Congress.47
State legislatures around the country show similar impressive
gains. Between 1970 and 1983 the number of black state repre-
sentative doubled.4" The number of African American mayors
increased to 247 from 48 during the same period,4 9 and the num-
ber of city council members quadrupled." During the 1980s and
1990s, many of America's largest cities have been led by African
American mayors.
Minority political progress has led to demographic changes in
city police forces. In Chicago, for example, twenty-five percent of
sworn officers are African American," and in Washington, D.C., a
majority of officers are African American. 2 New York, Washing-
ton, D.C., and Los Angeles have all had African American police
chiefs who were accountable to African American mayors.53
' See Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh and Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes in
America: Trends and Interpretations 28 (Harvard 1985), quoting Stephen F. Lawson,
Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South 1944-1969 330 (Columbia 1976).
Shuman, et al, Racial Attitudes at 28.
'7 Joint Center for Political Studies, Black Elected Officials: A National Roster
(UNIPUB 1996).
" Id.
49 Id.
Id.
s' Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statis-
tics 1994 table 1.36 at 49 (GPO 1995).
72 Id.
See Jim Dwyer, Lie Helps Riot Tensions Fester NY Daily News 8 (April 7, 1998)
(stating that New York Mayor David Dinkins and Police Commissioner Lee Brown are
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These data do not, of course, mean that everything produced
by the democratic process should automatically escape scrutiny.
But minority involvement in the political process should factor
into the court's analysis of laws promoted by minority residents
themselves.
Perhaps the most important reason why courts should take
notice of this phenomenon is that minority communities are using
their new political power to take charge of the crime problems
that plague their neighborhoods. They are working with their
elected officials to establish law enforcement policies that will
help them reinforce weak social structures that accompany
neighborhood poverty. They are not shunning the police. In-
stead, they are demanding that police give them the protection
they always deserved.
Why do they care? The disproportionate concentration of
crime in minority communities has also changed dramatically
since the 1960s: it has grown substantially worse. By the begin-
ning of the decade, violent crime victimization of minority youth
had reached a rate significantly higher than the rates for other
racial groups,' and today a majority of violent assault victims are
black.55 Minorities - particularly urban ones - are also much
more likely than non-minorities to be the victims of non-violent
property offenses." And in Chicago, while crime rates nationally
have been declining steadily over the last decade, they have in-
creased in the city's highest crime communities 7 - the same
communities whose Aldermen promoted the gang loitering ordi-
both black and served at the same time); Ron Harris, After the Verdicts, LA Times 1 (April
18, 1993) (stating that Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley and Police Chief Willie L. Wil-
liams served at the same time); Frank del Olmo, Parks is el Hombre, if Not un Hermano
LAPD, LA Times M5 (August 10, 1997) (stating that Williams was Los Angeles's first
black chief of police); Frank Clifford, Bradley Won't Run for 6th Term, LA Times 1 (Sept
25, 1992) (stating that Bradley was Los Angeles's first black mayor); Keith A. Harriston
and Mary Pat Flaherty, District Police Are Still Paying for Forced Hiring Binge, Wash
Post Al (Aug 28, 2994) (stating that D.C. Mayor Marion Barry and Police Chief Isaac
Fulwood served at the same time); Sari Horwitz, The Ghosts Are Always Around A Little
Bit, Wash Post Wl (June 30, 1991) (stating that Fulwood is black); and Vernon Loeb, A
Turbulent Era That Defined D.C. Comes to an End, Wash Post Al (May 22, 1998) (stating
that Barry is black).
' Lisa D. Bastian and Bruce M. Taylor, National Crime Victimization Survey: Young
Black Male Victims 1 (US Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics December, 1994).
Cheryl Ringel, National Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal Victimization 1996:
Changes 1995-96 with Trends 1993-96 4 (US Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics
November, 1997).
Id at 7.
Cornelia Grumman, Homicides in West Garfield Park: Like Chipping at a Glacier
With an Ice Pick, Chi Trib 1 (May 24, 1997) (noting that even as violent crime rates are
falling in Chicago, murder rates in some inner city neighborhoods continue to climb).
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nance.
58
The anti-community and anti-discretion principles that ani-
mate Papachristou address problems that no longer characterize
American political life. Given the emergence of African American
political power in the inner cities, it is no longer plausible to pre-
sume that all law enforcement policies adopted by local institu-
tions are designed to oppress minority citizens. These new condi-
tions require a new conception of rights - one that assures that
the individuals who have the most at stake make the difficult
choices anti-loitering provisions and the like present.
III. TOWARD A NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A 1990s conception of rights should follow two principles:
community burden sharing and guided discretion. The first de-
termines when courts should relax their individualist distrust of
community judgments, while the second assures that the trust
afforded community power is not abused.
Consider burden sharing first. The core justification for legal
enforcement of rights is the risk that a majority will not bear the
burdens of its laws but instead will abridge the liberty .of a pow-
erless or despised minority. A requirement that sex offenders
register with local authorities after being released from prison is
a notable example. It is not clear that such a law is unconstitu-
tional, but it is clear that the community should not have the last
word on the issue. The majority itself is not burdened by the law,
because sex offenders are despised by the community at large and
legally excluded from the political process. The community,
therefore, cannot be counted on to give adequate consideration to
the impact of the law on a sex offender's liberty.
This contemporary example demonstrates that the commu-
nity distrust principle has continuing relevance. But the as-
sumption that communities will not share in the burdens of law
enforcement techniques such as the gang loitering ordinance does
not make sense today given the political strength of African
Americans and their own legitimate concern to free themselves
from the ravages of inner-city crime. Instead of viewing all law-
enforcement techniques with suspicion, courts should ask
whether the community has internalized the burden that a par-
ticular law imposes on individual freedom. If it has, the court
should presume that the law does not violate individual rights.
See Kahan and Meares, (cited in note 14).
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Though the gang loitering law burdens the liberty of a mi-
nority - gang members and sometimes juveniles - most of
whose members might be disenfranchised, it is critical to under-
stand that this minority is by no means despised. Inner-city
teens and even gang members are linked to the majority by
strong social and familial ties. As sociologist Mary Patillo notes,
"residents who express their concern and anger over changes in
their community... recognize that putting up gates around the
entire neighborhood would not rid [it] of the problems [residents]
are experiencing because the troublemakers are natives." 9
Similarly, researcher Sudhir Venkatesh's work demonstrates
the numerous ways in which street gangs engage local communi-
ties.60 This empirical work, along with political scientist Michael
Dawson's explication of the notion of "linked fate" - the sense in
which many African Americans measure their individual well
being by assessing the well being of African Americans as a group
- supports an argument that minority residents of high crime
communities do not desire to cut themselves off entirely from
those against whom the gang loitering law was enforced.
In fact, it may be precisely because they care so deeply about
these persons that residents of the inner-city prefer relatively
mild gang loitering and curfew laws over draconian penalty en-
hancements for gang crimes, severe mandatory minimum prison
sentences for drug distribution, and similarly punitive measures.
Inner-city residents may believe these harsher penalties visit an
intolerably destructive toll on the whole community. The perva-
sive sense of linked fate between the majority of inner city resi-
dents and the youths affected by curfews and gang loitering ordi-
nances again furnishes a compelling reason not to second guess
the community's determination that such measures enhance
rather than detract from liberty.
Next is the principle of guided discretion. Thirty years ago,
when blacks were formally or functionally disenfranchised, white
political establishments could be relied upon - in fact could be
expected - to reward law enforcers who harassed minorities. By
objecting to the Jacksonville ordinance's vague language and in-
sisting upon specific rules, the Court hoped to limit such abuse by
law enforcement. Though their anxiety about the predictable
Mary Pattillo, Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers: Managing Crime in a Black Mid-
die-Class Neighborhood, 76 Social Forces 747 (March 1998).
' Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an
Urban Ghetto, 103 Am J Soc 82 (1997); Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Gang in the Corn-
munity (forthcoming 1998).
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response of law enforcers to a vague loitering ordinance made
sense thirty years ago, that anxiety is less sensible now that law
enforcers in America's big cities are accountable to political es-
tablishments that more fairly represent African Americans. Un-
compromising hostility to discretion is therefore inappropriate
because it interferes with the lines of political accountability that
are now being established between minorities and the elected
branches of government at the municipal level.
Of course the law should not be completely indifferent to dis-
cretion. Even assuming political accountability, unbounded dis-
cretion creates a risk that individual law enforcers will be able to
disregard the will of the community without detection. It also
creates the risk that officials will concentrate burdens on a pow-
erless or despised segment of the community, thereby under-
mining the principle of burden internalization. The principle of
"guided discretion" does not insist on hyper-specific rules, but it
does require that communities allocate authority in a manner
that minimizes these risks. Chicago's gang loitering ordinance is
a good example of a policy that satisfies the guided discretion
principle. The law was implemented through regulations that
clearly defined "gang member," and "loitering," and clearly speci-
fied which officers could enforce the law. Moreover, by requiring
community participation in the designation of enforcement areas,
the ordinance created a vehicle to strengthen political account-
ability of the police to community residents. Given these safe-
guards, courts should have upheld the gang loitering ordinance
whether or not it satisfied Papachristou's demand for hyper-
precision.
IV. THE FULL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONTROVERSY
We have explained why we think Youkhana and Morales are
wrong. We have also offered an alternative conception of rights
- one we believe superior to the anachronistic model advanced
by the Illinois courts. We now discuss what is at stake in this
debate.
While a different and updated conception of rights would al-
low Chicago to continue to enforce its gang loitering law, the
benefits of the analysis go beyond saving an ordinance that was
passed by an overwhelming margin of the Chicago City Council.
It is useful to look beneath the comments in the Police and Fire
hearing to understand why residents of poor, minority neighbor-
hoods favor Chicago's gang loitering ordinance. The answer lies
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in the connection between poverty and crime that occurs at the
neighborhood level.
In some areas of Chicago, many poor people of color live in
conditions of concentrated poverty and unemployment that pres-
age the breakdown of community social processes, which in turn
produce crime. Unlike other poor Americans, African Americans
who are poor often live in poor communities."' The overwhelm-
ingly poor communities in which many poor African Americans
live are marked by unemployment, family disruption, and resi-
dential instability.2 These conditions disrupt friendship net-
works, participation in formal organizations, and community-
wide supervision of teen peer groups.
Crime is often very high in Chicago's poor, minority neigh-
borhoods.' Criminal victimization is unfortunately common, and
because the vast majority of crimes against African Americans
are committed by other African Americans," the ffip side of dis-
proportionate criminal victimization is disproportionate involve-
ment of minorities in the criminal justice system. In 1994, about
40 percent of those on probation in Illinois were black, and 65
percent of the prison population was black in the same year -
numbers that no doubt suggest a substantial proportion of Illinois
black men under the control of the criminal justice system.'
The high proportion of African American men who have been
convicted of a crime means the enervation of one of the most po-
tent inducements of law-abiding behavior, namely, the stigma
that would otherwise attach to a criminal record. The high num-
" See Robert J. Sampson and William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race,
Crime and Urban Inequality, in John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson, eds, Crime and Ine-
quality 37, 41 (Stanford 1995).
6 This point has been made by numerous authors employing different approaches of
evaluation. See, for example, William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner
City, The Underclass, and Public Policy 20-62 (Chicago 1987); Douglas S. Massey and
Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass
(Harvard 1993); Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land The Great Black Migration and
How it Changed America (Vintage 1991); Alex Kotlowitz, There Are No Children Here: The
Story of Two Boys Growing Up in the Other America (Doubleday 1991); Christopher
Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass (Harvard 1992); John
M. Hagdorn, People and Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City (Lake
View 1988); Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Commu-
nity (Chicago 1990).
' The crime statistics, income levels, and racial distribution of Chicago neighbor-
hoods can be found and matched up with Chicago police precincts using figures from the
following website: http'/cgi.chicago.tribune.com/homes/commun/townlist.htm.
' Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks
and American Society (National Academy 1989).
Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook 1995 at 543, Table 6.26 at 562 (cited in
note 34).
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ber of men incarcerated means a dwindling supply of positive
male role models, and a disproportionately high percentage of
single mothers, whose own economic struggles deprive them of
the time needed to shield their children from the pressures that
draw them into crime. The perception that African Americans
are likely to be involved in crime reinforces white distrust and
suspicion of all African American men. Such attitudes put even
law-abiders at a disadvantage in the employment market and
hence reduce the return of living a law-abiding life.
Crime thus enfeebles social structures; enfeebled social
structures produce more crime; and crime destroys African
Americans' wealth and security. This self-reinforcing dynamic
constitutes one of the greatest impediments to improving the eco-
nomic and social standing of African Americans today.
Residents of high crime neighborhoods understand these dy-
namics. They seek methods to control crime that will not hurt
their children and their communities. Chicago's gang loitering
ordinance is an example of a policy tool that is a tolerably moder-
ate way to steer children away from criminality.66 The kids whom
the police cannot order off the streets today, they realize, are the
same ones they will be taking off to jail tomorrow.
Decisions such as Youkhana and Morales present a cruel
irony: the conception of rights advanced in those cases demon-
strates respect for individual liberty by destroying ever greater
amounts of it. When courts strike down crime-preventive meas-
ures such as the ordinance, legislatures inevitably attempt to
compensate with even more severe prison terms. Nothing is more
destructive of the lives of gang members and the communities
they come from than this style of law enforcement. In the end,
the gang members the Illinois courts attempted to protect are the
ones who lose the most.
The gang members also lose because courts cannot hope to
control exercise of police discretion simply by invalidating rea-
sonably specific public order laws like Chicago's gang loitering
ordinance. After the law is gone, police discretion remains, and
residents of crime-plagued communities will still clamor for bet-
ter protection. The Youkhana and Morales courts, along with
those who object to the gang loitering ordinance, are mistaken
when they argue that the ordinance broadens police discretion.
For an analogous discussion of drug laws, see Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race
and Class Differeces in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement, 1 Buff
Crim L Rev 137 (1997).
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As Professor Livingston so aptly noted, "Elimination of discretion
at one choice point merely causes the discretion that had been
exercised there to migrate elsewhere in the system." By simply
invalidating the laws, the courts prevent channels of account-
ability from being reinforced. In the process, they expose poten-
tial defendants to greater abuse.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Morales is sympto-
matic of a jurisprudence that has outlived its own political and
social presuppositions. If that jurisprudence is not overhauled,
Chicago's gang-loitering law will be only the first of many casual-
ties.
See Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 593 (cited in note 9) (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw,
Predelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J L Econ & Org 81,
97 (1985)).
